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Ackerman's Brown
ABSTRAC T. This essay contends that, despite its revisionist ethos, Professor Ackerman's We
the People: The Civil Rights Revolution is conventional in its assessment of Brown v. Board of
Education. Ackerman praises Brown as "the greatest judicial opinion of the twentieth century."
But the Supreme Court in Brown evaded offering a candid explanation of the white supremacist
purpose animating de jure racial segregation. Absent from the most honored race relations
decision in American constitutional law is any express reckoning with racism.
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INTRODUCTION
The judicial decision that Professor Bruce Ackerman discusses most
intensively in his sprawling, creative, and instructive account of the civil rights
revolution' is Brown v. Board of Education. In Brown and its companion case,
Bolling v. Sharpe,' the Supreme Court invalidated government action
authorizing or requiring the racial separation of pupils in primary and
secondary public schools. I pose four questions about Brown, relating my
answers to Professor Ackerman's analysis.
1. WHAT DID BROWN SAY?
According to Professor Ackerman, Chief Justice Earl Warren's opinion for
the Court in Brown deployed "judicial situation-sense" to tell "the common-
sense truth," which was that white "southerners were humiliating black
children by refusing to allow them to attend common schools with their
white peers."4
Is that characterization a realistic portrayal or translation of Warren's
Brown? I think not. Warren penned an opinion that, with regard to the
regulation of race relations, said as little as possible beyond concluding that "in
the field of public education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place"
and that "[s]eparate educational facilities are inherently unequal."s
Conspicuously absent from the opinion is any account of white Southerners'
humiliating black children. This omission was deliberate. Warren wrote
privately that he sought to craft an opinion that was "short, readable by the lay
public, non-rhetorical, unemotional, and, above all, non-accusatory."6 Warren
succeeded. His Brown opinion manages to invalidate de jure segregation
1. See 3 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION (2014).
2. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
3. 347 U.S. 497 (1954). The disputes resolved by Brown arose in states and were decided by
application of the Fourteenth Amendment. The dispute resolved by Bolling arose in the
District of Columbia, a federal jurisdiction rather than a state, and was decided by
application of the Fifth Amendment. Although the cases are separate and involved
somewhat different analyses, I shall refer to them as one, under the rubric of Brown, unless I
indicate differently in the pages that follow.
4. 3 ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 133.
5. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
6. JAMES T. PATTERSON, BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION: A CIVIL RIGHTS MILESTONE AND ITS




without castigating or indeed even mentioning the officials who imposed Jim
Crow oppression.
To be sure, Warren's opinion deals very differently with segregation than
previous opinions of the Court. In Plessy v. Ferguson,' the Court's most
influential affirmation of segregation's constitutionality, a majority of the
Justices scoffed at the idea that a governmentally imposed regime of separate
but equal facilities could reasonably be viewed as an unfriendly, indeed
stigmatizing, form of discrimination against blacks. According to the Plessy
Court, if blacks felt insulted by the requirement of a separation of the races, the
insult arose "not by reason of anything found in the act, but solely because the
colored race chooses to put that construction upon it."" Subsequently, scores of
jurists, including some of the most esteemed of the twentieth century,
complacently affirmed the baleful notion of separate but equal, accepting the
blatant lie that state-mandated racial separation could somehow be squared
with equality before the law.9 By contrast, Warren's Brown gave no rhetorical
support to segregation.
Still, the Chief Justice's description of segregation in Brown is strikingly
wan. It says remarkably little about segregation's origins, ideology,
implementation, or aims. A reader of Brown alone, with no knowledge of
American race relations, might well be mystified by the hurt and anger of those
protesting against segregation, simply because Warren's opinion is so
diffident. Warren avers that "[t]o separate [blacks] from others of similar age
and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority
as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a
way unlikely ever to be undone.""o He embraces the finding of a lower court
that "the policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting the
inferiority of the negro group."" He also asserts in Bolling v. Sharpe that
"segregation is not reasonably related to any proper governmental objective.""
But Warren's opinion says nothing about the aims of segregation. He
7. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
8. Id. at 551.
9. See, e.g., Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927). In a unanimous ruling written by Chief Justice
William Howard Taft, the Supreme Court upheld the judgment of the Mississippi Supreme
Court that people of Chinese ancestry could be assigned to schools reserved to "colored"
students under the state law governing racial segregation in public schooling. The Court
evinced no disquiet whatsoever with racial segregation. Justices Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.,
and Louis Brandeis were among those who voted to affirm that judgment.
io. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494.
n. Id.
12. 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954).
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concludes that it has baleful effects but avoids mentioning whether those
consequences were intentional. Because Warren insisted upon writing an
opinion that was non-accusatory, he omitted a central aspect of the segregation
story: the reason why white supremacists desired to separate whites and blacks
pursuant to the coercive force of state power. Missing from the most honored race
relations decision in American constitutional law is any express reckoning with
13racism.
Dissenting in Plessy, Justice John Marshall Harlan did reckon with
segregation's racism. Harlan's observation with respect to public railway
coaches was applicable to public school classrooms as well: "What can more
certainly arouse race hate . . . than state enactments which, in fact, proceed on
the ground that colored citizens are so inferior and degraded that they cannot
be allowed to sit in public coaches occupied by white citizens?"" Appropriately
mocking segregation's "thin disguise" of delusive symmetry, Harlan remarked
that "[e]veryone knows that [segregation] had its origin in the purpose, not so
much to exclude white persons from railroad cars occupied by blacks, as to
exclude colored people from coaches occupied by . .. white persons."" Harlan
pointed out that segregation was something done by whites to blacks (and
other racial minorities). Harlan recognized that segregation was a deliberate
negation of racial equality and a deliberate assertion of racial superiority.
Harlan noted that segregation was meant to "protect" whites from the
supposedly contaminating influence of colored people. None of these points is
driven home, or even much hinted at, in Warren's non-accusatory opinion.
The Chief Justice never even cites Harlan's dissent.
II. HOW SHOULD WE ASSESS THE BROWN OPINION?
Professor Ackerman is unstinting in his praise of Warren's Brown opinion.
It is, he writes, "the greatest judicial opinion of the twentieth century.
13. The writing that brings out this point most strikingly is the single best article written thus
far about the unconstitutionality of racial segregation, Charles L. Black, Jr.'s justly
celebrated The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421 (1960).
14. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 560 (1896).
i. Id. at 557.
16. 3 ACKERImAN, supra note 1, at 317. Elsewhere Professor Ackerman writes that "there is great
wisdom in Warren's opinion," id. at 128, that Brown "marks the greatest moment in the
history of the Court," id., that the Court displayed "great effort of constitutional leadership
in Brown," id. at 322, that Brown represented the Warren Court's "greatest success in judicial
leadership," id. at 324, and that the idea voiced in the Brown opinion constituted a "great




Whether Ackerman is correct depends on what he means by "greatest." He is
probably correct if by greatness he refers to consequentiality. Among other
things, Brown invalidated deeply entrenched state laws that blanketed the
South, reflected and reinforced the civil rights movement, won for the Court
tremendous prestige in large areas of the country and internationally,
generated a backlash that transformed Southern politics, and recast senatorial
confirmation of judicial nominees.
I suspect, however, that in describing Warren's opinion as "the greatest" of
the twentieth century, Ackerman means to do more than comment on its
ramifications. He probably intends also to laud its legal, moral, political, and
intellectual character. But here we encounter a problem: Warren's opinion is
deficient in important respects. For one thing, the opinion is unclear regarding
the precise basis on which the Court invalidated de jure segregation in public
primary and secondary schools. Was the key the social significance of the
activity in question-schooling? Was it the psychological effect of segregation
on the black schoolchildren? Was it that segregation stemmed from purposeful
government action? Or was it racial separation per se? The Delphic ambiguity
of the Brown opinion has generated a remarkable catalogue of commentary and
launched thousands of contentious discussions in law school classes. If clarity
of exposition and thoroughness of explication are elements of greatness in a
judicial opinion, however, then Warren's Brown is ineligible.
The opacity of Warren's opinion has facilitated the use of Brown as a
Rorschach test that provokes and allows observers to cast upon it a wide array
of competing interpretations. One aspect of the case that should be clear,
however, is that segregation represented a deliberate, self-conscious effort to
privilege whites while disadvantaging people of color. Yet Warren's opinion
veils that obvious and fundamental feature of the controversy. Warren's Brown
portrays segregation without segregationists, stigma without stigmatizers, an
injustice without perpetrators of the wrong.
I am not condemning Warren. Perhaps he was right to engage in strategic
obfuscation. Perhaps he was prudent to avoid candor about the segregationists.
Perhaps he was wise to pull his punches to secure unanimity. But even if we
agree with his rhetorical strategy, we ought to recognize its price: continued
denial of the full ugly story of racism in America. Warren's Brown opinion
glosses over the realities of segregation. If candor, clarity, and
comprehensiveness are essential features of "greatness" in a judicial opinion,
then for yet another reason the Brown opinion is ineligible for that honorific
distinction.
As with other positive developments in the law of American race relations,
the fact that Brown was conceived in compromise has largely been forgotten.
Grateful for any relief from racism, we overlook the limitations of reforms we
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revere despite their deficiencies. The Emancipation Proclamation is often
celebrated for having "freed the slaves," though it left unaffected the legal
status of around eight hundred thousand of those slaves. Justified by President
Abraham Lincoln only as a weapon of war, the Emancipation Proclamation
makes no mention of the blessings of liberty or the curse of bondage."1 The
Fourteenth Amendment, often unequivocally lauded nowadays, was a keen
disappointment to many advocates of African-American advancement in that it
merely imposed a political penalty for racial disenfranchisement but permitted
the states to continue racial exclusion at the ballot box." The Fifteenth
Amendment, often unconditionally celebrated now, was among the narrowest
of the constitutional voting rights provisions under consideration in 1870.
Even as it was being framed, the Fifteenth Amendment was understood to be
easily evaded."
Warren's Brown is sometimes lionized in ways that prompt one to wonder
whether its most enthusiastic celebrants have actually read the opinion.
Professor Ackerman is right when he complains that even leading academic
17. The Emancipation Proclamation freed slaves only in jurisdictions in rebellion against the
United States. It left unaffected some eight hundred thousand slaves. It did not free those
held in bondage in the four slave states that remained in the Union-Missouri (the locus,
ironically, of Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856)), Delaware, Kentucky,
and Maryland. Richard Hofstadter famously quipped that the Emancipation Proclamation
displayed all of the "moral grandeur of a bill of lading." RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE
AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION 131 (1948). On the other hand, the Emancipation
Proclamation did free over three million slaves, making it-in the words of Charles and
Mary Beard-"the most stupendous act of sequestration in the history of Anglo Saxon
jurisprudence." CHARLES A. BEARD & MARY R. BEARD, THE RISE OF AMERICAN CIVILIZATION
100 (1927).
is. Wendell Phillips, for example, condemned the Fourteenth Amendment as "a fatal and total
surrender." ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA's UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-
1877, at 255 (1988). Phillips was referring to Section Two of the Fourteenth Amendment,
which provides for a reduction in congressional representation in proportion to the number
of male citizens denied suffrage:
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their
respective numbers. ... But when the right to vote at any election for the choice
of electors . . . is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being
twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged
. . . the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which
the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens
twenty-one years of age in such State.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
19. See WILLIAM GILLETTE, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: POLITICS AND PASSAGE OF THE FIFTEENTH
AMENDMENT 25 (1965); ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED




interpreters do not seem to take Warren's text seriously. They fail, he notes, "to
study Warren's words with care -choosing to see the opinion as a way-station
to some far more glorious principle."2 o Brown's message, he insists, "deserve[s]
to be considered carefully in its own terms."" The irony is that Ackerman
replicates the error he identifies. He does not so much explain what Warren
actually wrote as use bits of what the Chief Justice wrote to construct a
platform for launching his own anti-humiliation principle-a praiseworthy
theory to be sure, but not one that Warren authored.
The Brown opinion contains, according to Ackerman, a "single master
insight[:] . . . the distinctive wrongness of institutionalized humiliation."2 2
What the Court announced to governments in America, he claims, is that
"[t]hou shalt not humiliate." 3 Ackerman's portrayal of a Brown anti-
humiliation principle, however, fails to account for at least two important
features of the Court's conduct. First, with respect to enforcement of Brown,
the Warren Court was egregiously permissive for at least a decade. In Brown
II," where the Court initially posited the ground rules for administering Brown
I, the Court did not demand that the aggrieved black children be released
immediately from the confines of segregation. All the Court required was "a
prompt and reasonable start"25 and, thereafter, desegregation with "all
deliberate speed." 1 6 The commandment "Thou Shalt Not Humiliate" would
seem to entail something more urgent than the permissive timetable of "all
deliberate speed."
Second, as Ackerman recognizes, the Brown opinion invalidated narrowly
de jure segregation in public primary and secondary schooling; it did not
gesture broadly toward the proscription of segregation in other spheres of
social life-transportation, recreation, marriage. The end of de jure segregation
would come to those realms only after many difficult campaigns in the decade
and a half following Brown. 7
2o. 3 ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 240.
21. Id. at 242.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 298.
24. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
25. Id. at 300.
26. Id. at 3o.
27. See, e.g., Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956); Holmes v. Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955);
Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955).
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III. WHAT WAS THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE BROWN OPINION TO
THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964?
Having posited that Brown announced an anti-humiliation principle,
Ackerman maintains that important political actors embraced that principle,
internalized its lesson, and spread its message beyond courtrooms to other
lawgiving forums, most importantly Congress and the presidency. "Over the
course of a decade," Ackerman writes, "the initial rendering of [the anti-
humiliation] principle in Brown moved far beyond the ambit of courts to gain
deliberate assent by leading representatives of the American people . . . .,,8
am not persuaded, however, by Professor Ackerman's suggestion that Brown
was a Bible containing gospel that was translated into legislation through the
ministrations of Martin Luther King, Jr., Lyndon Johnson, Hubert Humphrey,
and Everett Dirksen. Brown is surely among the score of important
developments that mirrored and reinforced the broad current of racial
liberalism that animated and shaped the Civil Rights Act. But Ackerman insists
upon claiming for Brown more than that: "Brown not only represents the
unanimous judgment of the Supreme Court at a great moment in its history; it
expresses the animating logic for the landmark statutes supported by the
American People at one of the greatest moments in their history."" Warren's
opinion, Ackerman maintains, is the "key" that unlocks the mystery of "the
distinctive character of solemn commitments endorsed by the American people
in the landmark statutes"3 o of the Second Reconstruction. To Ackerman, Brown
did more than express the anti-humiliation principle; it taught that principle in
an effective way that caught on with influential actors who spread the gospel.
According to Ackerman, "Brown's common-sense prose served to anchor the
next decade's constitutional debate -serving as a target for opponents as well
as a rallying point for defenders.""
Where, however, is the evidence that Brown served "to anchor" debate over
the Civil Rights Act of 1964? Ackerman does not show Martin Luther King, Jr.,
Hubert Humphrey, or Everett Dirksen alluding to Brown or paying homage to
it as they championed the Civil Rights Act. What they declared was consistent
with Brown, but what they declared was also consistent with other notable
statements, including To Secure These Rights: The Report of the President's
Committee on Civil Rights, which was submitted to President Harry S. Truman
28. 3 ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 137.
29. Id. at 133.
30. Id. at 317.




in 1947.2 That Brown exerted a formative influence over the champions of the
Civil Rights Act is certainly plausible. But did it actually do so? This is an
empirical question that Ackerman elides with an assumption.
That Ackerman gives such a prominent role to Brown in the Civil Rights
Act drama is ironic given that one of the key and commendable aims of his
book is to recalibrate the perspective of legal academics, draw them away from
their parochial over-emphasis on the judiciary, and banish, or at least
moderate, "great case-ism"-the habit of seeing the history of America's legal
development as mainly and merely an accretion of Supreme Court rulings.
Ackerman's discussion of Brown, however, is great case-ism with a vengeance.
He assumes that Warren's opinion was prominently on the minds of the key
supporters of the Civil Rights Act. But he does not show that it was. Senator
Humphrey did not draw upon Warren's Brown in making the case for the Civil
Rights Act. He did not have to. The sensibility, commitment, and
understanding that fired and guided the Senator's advocacy for the Civil
Rights Act predated Brown. One can see those qualities in, among other
statements, the impassioned speech that Humphrey (then the Mayor of
Minneapolis, Minnesota) delivered at the 1948 Democratic National
Convention." Prevailing over the most established figures in the Democratic
Party and facing down its segregationist wing, Humphrey succeeded in
establishing a party platform regarding civil rights that anticipated the ethos of
the Second Reconstruction six years before Brown.
IV. WHAT ROLE SHOULD BROWN PLAY IN PROGRESSIVE
MOVEMENTS?
Because Brown has become iconic, a landmark that cannot be questioned
seriously outside of academia without risk of severe self-discrediting, 4 activists
32. PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON CIVIL RIGHTS, To SECURE THESE RIGHTS (1947).
33. See TIMOTHY N. THURBER, THE POLITICS OF EquALITY: HUBERT H. HUMPHREY AND THE
AFRICAN AMERICAN FREEDOM STRUGGLE 62 (1999) ("There will be no hedging-no
watering down -of the instruments of the civil rights program. To those who say we are
rushing this issue of civil rights - I say to them, we are 172 years late! To those who say that
this bill of rights program is an infringement of states' rights, I say this -the time has
arrived for the Democratic party to get out of the shadow of states' rights and walk
forthrightly into the bright sunshine of human rights." (quoting Mayor Hubert Humphrey,
Address at the Democratic National Convention (July 14, 1948))).
34. See Jack M. Balkin, Brown as Icon, in WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE
SAID 3, 4 (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2001) ("No federal judicial nominee and no mainstream
national politician today would dare suggest that Brown was wrongly decided."); see also
Michael J. Klarman, Brown v. Board of Education: Facts and Political Correctness, 8o VA. L.
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of various stripes strive mightily to stamp upon it their version of its meaning.
Professor Ackerman attempts to make Brown maximally usable for progressives
by making a virtue of the problem with the opinion that I previously noted: the
omission of the white supremacist perpetrator from the story of segregation.
By minimizing that omission, Ackerman broadens the scope of the Brown
opinion by making liability for institutionalized humiliation turn not on the
presence of a bigot - a figure of thankfully decreasing prevalence - but instead
on the presence of social conditions that can be deemed to injure illicitly the
hearts and minds of members of vulnerable groups. Ackerman tries to renovate
Warren's Brown to make it useful in the fight against institutionalized as well
as personalized racism, and further, the fight against all manner of oppression
(including racial oppression). Hence Ackerman writes that
[i]f taken seriously, the principles announced in Earl Warren's great
opinion have a broad reach: blacks and women, Muslim and Hispanic
Americans, the mentally and physically disabled, gays, lesbians, and the
transgendered-all these people often find themselves in conditions of
institutionalized humiliation. They are all entitled to constitutional
protection under Brown's understanding of the Equal Protection
Clause. . . .s
The social injustice that Ackerman sees as the worst in our time, however, is
the mistreatment of the undocumented: "If we look squarely at social reality, as
Brown demands, no thoughtful American can ignore the daily humiliations
heaped upon the eleven million undocumented immigrants who live among
us.""6 The only serious question, Ackerman maintains, is whether the
Constitution allows today's Americans to treat the undocumented in the same
demeaning fashion in which Southerners treated blacks before the civil rights
revolution. If the spirit of Brown survives "in the living Constitution, the
answer must be no." 7
I share Professor Ackerman's outrage at the manifold injustices that blight
our society and admire his commitment to inspiring and guiding progressive
reforms that can suitably address these inequities. I disagree, however, with the
way in which he enlists the Brown opinion in his project of creating a
constitutional history usable for contemporary reformism. He both distorts the
REv. 185 (1994); Brad Snyder, How the Conservatives Canonized Brown v. Board of
Education, 52 RUTGERs L. REv. 383 (2000).
35. 3 ACKERM-AN, supra note 1, at 335.
36. Id.




historic Brown opinion and leads current reformers astray. Ackerman puffs
Brown up into an omnibus, all-purpose "promise" of social justice. This broad
conception of Brown, however, is in sharp tension with the narrowness and
diffidence of Warren's Brown, that actual set of opinions in 1954 and 1955 that
was non-accusatory, carefully delimited to public education, and accepting of
"all deliberate speed." Ackerman engages in wishful thinking, claiming that
Brown promised more than it actually did. It invalidated de jure segregation in
public schooling, and it created a basis on which, after much conflict,
segregation was prohibited in virtually all areas of social life. That was a major
undertaking. But it was an undertaking that did not embrace the whole project
of racial justice (much less social justice). It did not embrace, for example, the
problem of racial separation caused by racially stratified residential patterns
(the issue of so-called de facto segregation), the problem of racial
discrimination imposed by private as opposed to public actors (the issue
involving public accommodations addressed by Title II of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964), or the problem of rectifying the lingering disabilities inflicted by past
oppression (the issue addressed initially by compensatory positive
discrimination, also known as "affirmative action").
I want to avoid any hint of churlishness here. The creators of Brown -the
neglected named plaintiffs, their celebrated lawyers, the Justices who allowed
themselves to break with tradition-all warrant congratulations, honor, and
gratitude. The Brown opinion is a vehicle that carried essential freight. It was a
crucial intervention that addressed an important problem- de jure segregation.
But it should not be viewed as a vehicle that can carry all of the burdens of
racial justice. Progressives ought to recognize its limitations and stop looking
to Brown as an authoritative guide to solving problems beyond its borders.
In The Civil Rights Revolution, Professor Ackerman rightly urges avoidance
of ancestor worship. The ancestors to which he refers are the framers of the
First Reconstruction, the authors of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth
Amendments. He suggests that we cease idolizing them and pay greater respect
to the framers of the Second Reconstruction -the authors of Brown, the Civil
Rights Act, the Voting Rights Act, and the Fair Housing Act. Both sets of
framers did important work that moved America away from slavery,
segregation, and other formalized patterns of racial subordination. But both
sets of framers were also captives of their own contexts, forced to make
compromises that we now all too often view uncritically as unequivocal
victories. To address adequately the crises we confront will require more than
habitual incantations to Brown and other landmarks of prior struggles. It will
require forging altogether new laws, new doctrines, and new understandings
pertinent to the demands of our own time.
3075
